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1. Introduction 
Consumer engagement in markets for services such as retail banking, insurance (home, 
car, life, travel, etc.) and household energy (electricity and gas) offers the potential for 
significant savings from active participation (Keaveney 1995). Nevertheless, actual switching 
rates are low, which reflects transactions costs (real and perceived) might be high.  
In the 1990s, Great Britain became the first country to allow retail competition in the 
residential electricity and gas sectors. Consumer switching behavior is a key factor in 
understanding retail energy markets, as it may reveal the state of the competition in the market 
and the nature of consumer engagement on homogeneous goods (Defeuilley 2009) since there 
is no difference between a particular electron or molecule of natural gas. Despite the potential 
for financial gains by changing their energy supplier and/or renegotiating the contract with their 
existing supplier, the average residential consumer is not active enough in searching out 
alternative tariffs or providers to get a better deal (Giulietti et al. 2010; ECME Consortium 
2010). In recent years, the annual switching rates have remained below pre-2008 levels, leading 
to a loss of significant potential savings for British households. Even if a consumer does not 
switch suppliers however, there are other means of engaging in the retail market while 
remaining with the same supplier including changing tariffs or changing payment method, for 
example, by moving to direct debit.   
The British energy regulator, Ofgem (Office for Gas and Electricity Markets), has sought 
to encourage households to be more active in the market (Ofgem 2011) and this attention has 
been amplified by political concern over energy prices (He & Reiner, 2017) and more active 
engagement of consumer groups. As the issue of energy prices became more politically salient 
in the UK and prices rose over the 2007-10 period, Ofgem launched an ‘energy supply probe’ 
in 2008 followed by a Retail Market Review (RMR) launched in 2010. As a result, a number 
of additional information-related measures were introduced over the subsequent years aimed at 
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helping consumers to understand available tariffs and navigate the market. For instance, in 2014 
Ofgem introduced an array of comparison tools or mechanisms including Cheapest Tariff 
Messaging (CTM), Tariff Comparison Rates (TCR) and Personal Projections (PPs) (Ofgem 
2014), in addition to the ‘Be An Energy Shopper’ campaign and began imposing Standards of 
Conduct license conditions (from 2013, amended in 2017) (Ofgem 2017).  
Apart from regulatory efforts, there are numerous independent price comparison websites 
(PCWs) in the UK that have operated for many years. Of the ten largest, 70% of supplier 
switches were made using three sites: uSwitch (established in 2000), MoneySuperMarket 
(1999) and Cheap Energy Club (affiliated with moneysavingexpert.com that launched the Club 
in 2013) (CMA 2017, p149). In spite of the diversity of options and the relative ease of 
switching, 56% of domestic customers in the UK energy market claimed to never have 
switched supplier, 34% of respondents have never considered switching supplier, according to 
the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) survey report (2016). TNS (2016) also noted 
that a significant (but declining) share of consumers remain on the ‘standard variable tariff’ 
(SVT), which is the ‘default’ tariff and is generally the most expensive over time. TNS (2016) 
claimed that price and the desire to achieve savings were the strongest drivers for switching 
and comparison activity in the energy market, while acknowledging that price does not seem 
to be a strong motivator for some consumers, particularly less engaged consumers.  
Still not satisfied with the state of retail markets, the CMA was asked to conduct an 
investigation into competition in UK energy markets (CMA 2016). The CMA identified ‘weak 
customer engagement’ as the most significant concern and found that Ofgem’s reforms after 
2011 actually weakened competition in the sector.  
The actions by Ofgem, on the one hand, have generally not satisfied consumer groups 
and politicians eager to see more active intervention, and on the other, have been found to be 
problematic by many economists reviewing the evidence. Littlechild (2016) argues that from 
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2008, “The competitive market glass had gone from half-full to half-empty”. The empirical 
basis of Ofgem polices, its non-discrimination clauses, and attention given to reducing the 
number of tariffs rather than tariff innovations have been questioned (Waddams Price & Zhu 
2016; Pollitt & Haney 2014). Although the regulator Ofgem is nominally independent of 
government, it was buffeted between its mandates to defend consumers and political pressures. 
Even in the UK which has taken the lead in opening its energy markets, and where consumers 
have the longest experience with competition and have switched more than virtually anywhere 
else, the notion of energy being a different sort of consumer good remains (FDS 2008).  
We use Ofgem’s own detailed market research to investigate the motives and 
obstacles associated with household behavior in energy markets, with a focus on the role of 
information, given all the attention the subject has received. The rest of the analysis proceeds 
as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature; Section 3 presents the methodological 
framework, while Section 4 outlines the main features of the survey investigation, variable 
definitions and the statistics. Section 5 presents the results of the econometric analysis, and 
finally, Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature 
Switching barriers, which act to prevent consumers from switching or increase the 
difficulty of switching, have been associated with direct switching costs, consumer preferences, 
emotional and cognitive ability, interpersonal relationships, as well as financial, social, and 
psychological risks (Mattila 2001; Burnham et al. 2003; Ek & Söderholm 2008; Wolter et al. 
2017; Hortaçsu et al. 2017). 
Burnham et al. (2003) define switching costs as “the onetime costs that customers 
associate with the process of switching from one provider to another, as opposed to the ongoing 
costs associated with using a product or provider once a repeat-purchase relationship is 
established.” In particular, we emphasize here the "onetime" nature of switching costs (Porter 
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1980; Burnham et al. 2003). In this context, the concept of switching cost, in a broad sense, 
involves search, learning, and transactions costs, as well as customer habits, cognitive effort, 
and a wide range of risks (Fornell 1992). 
Some studies seek to distinguish the subtle differences between switching costs and 
search costs. For instance, Honka (2014) defines search costs as the cost to the consumer of 
conducting one search, and switching costs as the cost a consumer incurs upon switching 
providers after the search has been completed. Similarly, Wilson (2012) defines search costs as 
“the costs incurred by a consumer in identifying a firm's product and price, regardless of 
whether the consumer then buys the product from the searched firm or not”, and switching costs 
as “the costs incurred by a consumer in changing suppliers that do not act to improve the 
consumer's pre-purchase information”, and shows that gathering and processing necessary 
information about alternative suppliers produces the key difference between the two costs.  
As switching costs in the broad sense need not be incurred immediately upon switching 
(Burnham et al. 2003), and search (or switching) costs need not be limited to financial costs, it 
is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the two costs in practice. Whether price or non-
price factors are used to explain barriers to switching has largely been a function of the 
discipline conducting the study. Economists tend to approach switching behavior from an 
absolute or net gains or loss perspective and primarily emphasize price whereas psychologists 
tend to focus on non-price considerations and decision-making shortcuts and heuristics. 
Obviously, this is primarily a question of emphasis in both instrument design and in presenting 
results, rather than a deliberate exclusion of alternative explanations and both literatures try to 
grapple with questions of search costs in their own ways. 
Burnham et al. (2003) identify three types of switching costs: (a) financial costs; (b) 
procedural costs (time, effort, and uncertainty in identifying and adopting a new provider); and 
(c) relational costs (e.g., personal relationship with supplier). When a consumer faces switching 
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costs, the rational consumer will not switch to the supplier offering the lowest price if the costs 
outweigh the price differential between the suppliers. 
Inertia is a powerful force in the market (Daglish 2016). Studies taking more of a 
psychological perspective pay greater attention to non-price sources of inertia. For example, 
Shah et al (2016) find that those paying with more ‘painful’ payment forms (such as cash or 
check) increase their emotional attachment to the existing product and reduce their commitment 
to alternatives. Moreover, inattention to the task of choosing a better tariff is likely to be a 
substantial problem in energy markets. Hortaçsu et al. (2017) explore two sources of inertia in 
electricity markets – (i) households do not frequently consider offerings of alternative retailers 
and (ii) they attach a significant brand advantage to the incumbent – and conclude that non-
price sources of inertia are likely to be the primary barrier, which may be reduced by low-cost 
information intervention. 
Studies bring to light the importance of knowledge and information. Ratchford (2001) 
points out lifestyle differences are simply due to differences in knowledge or expertise at 
engaging in different activities. Six et al. (2017) find that better–informed customers have a 
significantly higher switching probability, using availability of an online price comparison tool 
as the indicator for access to information. The difference between initial information setup costs 
and ongoing information usage costs over time and consumers' time preferences explains 
consumers' reluctance to search extensively for better alternatives and ultimately switch 
(Zauberman 2003). 
Willingness to switch would decrease if consumers perceive an increase in the costs of 
information search (Urbany 1986). Search costs can be divided into internal and external costs 
(Smith et al. 1999). Internal costs include the mental effort given over to undertaking the search, 
sorting through the information, and integrating it with what the consumer already knows. 
Internal costs depend on a consumer's ability to undertake the search, and that ability is 
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associated with levels of knowledge, education, etc. External costs include the monetary costs 
of acquiring the information, and the opportunity cost of the time put into searching out this 
external information. There may also be interactions, for example, Giulietti et al (2014) argue 
that even as search costs fell over time, the proliferation of ever more complicated tariffs 
discouraged switching.   
Our interest here is in exploring the importance of information in different contexts and 
their potential impacts on different forms of household participation in energy markets. Our 
analysis is based on three surveys commissioned by the British regulator Ofgem and carried 
out by the market research firm TNS BMRB in 2014, 2015 and 2016 (TNS 2016). The 
questionnaires collected information about behavior in gas and electricity markets, views and 
attitudes towards the market, as well as socio-economic characteristics. Although not 
completely identical, both the order and the vast majority of questions were kept consistent 
over the course of the three years. Based on a multiple binary-choice framework, we analyze 
three different forms of participation of households in the energy market over the year prior to 
the survey. 
3. Methodology 
Previous studies modeling switching behaviors in retail markets generally focus on change 
between retailers, and most use single equation logistic or probit regressions as the preferred 
estimation method (Ek & Söderholm 2008; Xiao et al. 2014; Six et al. 2017). In line with 
Littlechild (2000), the success of retail competition should not be judged solely by the share of 
customers who have switched supplier, rather we suppose changing energy suppliers (ESs), 
energy tariffs (ETs) and energy bill payment methods (PMs) are all related elements of market 
participation. We estimate the determinants of these three behaviors together using a 
multivariate probit model, in which the equations for each outcome are estimated 
simultaneously under the assumption that the error terms follow a joint normal distribution 
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(Greene 2008). If these behaviors are correlated, then joint estimation would produce more 
precise standard errors. Furthermore, it allows us to test for the existence of unobserved factors 
influencing all outcomes, through the statistical significance of such correlations.  
Our analysis employs an analytical framework which embraces both economic and 
psychological motives behind consumer behavior. Our study differs from others insofar as it 
investigates various types of consumer switching behavior simultaneously, within a single 
econometric framework. Moreover, the multi-year dataset allows us to explore the dynamics 
of household behavior in the market and explore whether and/or the extent to which different 
factors which influence the likelihood that households participate in the market also changed.  
3.1. Hypotheses 
Consumer decision making on switching typically involves several stages. The first step is 
to recognize the problem, i.e. to identify a motivation to switch followed by searching out 
information on the options available. The next step involves comparing and evaluating 
alternatives and then the switching stage itself.  
Many economic studies of consumer choice have used a random utility model framework, 
assuming rational behavior, i.e., that individuals maximize subjective expected utility with 
perfect information. By contrast, bounded rationality assumes that individuals’ decisions are 
“determined not only by some consistent overall goal and the properties of the external world, 
but also by the knowledge that decision makers do and don't have of the world” (Simon 2000). 
Information is essential for consumers making decisions in the energy market – access to 
information and the ability to process will impact switching behaviors. We introduce different 
forms of information to capture any effects of bounded rationality on household decisions. 
Consumers seeking information must navigate both an internal context and an external 
context (within which the information seeker operates) (Foster 2004). Internal search typically 
incurs little cost of time or money while external search often involves significant expenditures 
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in terms of money and time and may involve uncertainty. Internal search involves identifying 
the alternatives from one’s own memory and will be unique to each information seeker. 
“Internal” information is particularly important for experiential products where consumers are 
more likely to rely on internal search for qualitative/experience type attributes (Moore & 
Lehman 1980; Grant et al. 2007). The internal context is primarily the level of experience and 
prior knowledge held by the information seeker (Foster 2004).  
When better alternatives are absent in the market, consumers will not switch. Similarly, if 
customers have not recognized that there are better options available in the market, the customer 
will not switch, even if she or he is not satisfied with their current supplier (Ping 1993). 
Consumers choosing not to switch may result from a belief that there is no difference between 
suppliers rather than loyalty to the current supplier. Daglish (2016) suggests many customers 
may be unaware of the possibility of switching or may have only partial information regarding 
the potential benefits. There may even be a concern that switching will not lead to savings but 
would turn out to be costlier and there is some evidence that a fraction of switchers actually 
wind up on a worse tariff (Wilson & Waddams, 2010). Therefore, we assume that if consumers 
have a better sense of their energy expenditures and of energy tariffs, they can more accurately 
evaluate the gains by switching. Accordingly, we propose the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: Belief that there are no tariff differences between suppliers decreases engagement in 
energy markets.  
H2: Knowledge of one’s own energy expenditure is related to greater engagement in 
energy markets.  
H3: Greater familiarity with energy tariffs leads to greater engagement in energy markets.  
 
The types of information which underpin engagement with the market are all based on an 
individual’s estimations and professed knowledge (of their energy bill) and judgments (of the 
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availability of alternatives), but no assessment is made as to the accuracy of those perceptions. 
We use binary variables to measure these perceptions.  
External information search involves asking friends or neighbors’ opinions, referring to 
websites, user manuals, advertisements or media coverage, making inquiries with brokers or 
directly with firms, etc. As information search has migrated to the Internet, switching behaviors 
might be expected to follow. Flores and Waddams Price (2018) suggest internet-based remedies 
are particularly effective amongst those who are already active, rather than stimulating activity 
among the less engaged. The Internet can eliminate or at least greatly reduce search costs and 
improve the efficiency of information dissemination (Klein 1998; Pereira 2005; Khatwani & 
Das 2015). However, collecting more information from one information source does not 
necessarily reduce the efforts put into other sources (Bei et al. 2004). We propose the following 
hypotheses as possible mechanisms for consumer engagement with external information: 
 
H4: Internet access promotes consumer engagement in energy markets. 
H5: Messages from energy suppliers promotes greater consumer engagement in energy 
markets. 
H6: There may be an interaction between the two types of external information. 
 
Internet access and messages from suppliers have very different implications for 
information exchange. Ease of access to Internet services and trust in online information could 
affect the frequency of online information search, the diversity of online information obtained, 
and the preference for using the Internet in any initial search (Xiao et al. 2014). The frequency 
of online activity is, perhaps unsurprisingly, largely explained by ease-of-use and the perceived 
usefulness of information obtained from the Internet (Bei et al. 2004). We derive our variable 
for Internet-derived information based on how often consumers get online. Obviously, the level 
of engagement not only reflects the channel by which consumers seek information, but also 
 12 
 
captures how much effort they will need to put into browsing and screening the information 
online, assuming that those generally more familiar with the Internet will find it easier to collect 
the requisite information at lower cost. In comparison to the other main form of external 
information, seeking information via the Internet is more complicated because it may include 
interactions between internet users, between consumers and suppliers and with different third-
party sources such as PCWs. We expect that the effect of Internet use on household engagement 
will be positive.  
Households may receive messages from suppliers with “passive attention”1 People spend 
substantially more time receiving information passively than actively (Robinson 2010). When 
a consumer receives a message from a supplier, the message will not be very helpful in making 
decisions if the consumer does not understand it or does not process it. If the consumer was 
able to put more effort into processing it, the message could play a more useful role. Thus, the 
message and Internet variables should enhance each other in encouraging participation, in other 
words, the coefficient of the cross-term is expected to be positive (Hypothesis H6).  
Moreover, the information patterns measured by the supplier’s message can be partially 
reflected in the Internet information. For instance, the message can be provided both by email 
and the supplier’s website. Therefore, these two types of external information are homogenous 
to a certain degree, in terms of content and source. When such information is separated into 
two variables and their cross term is included in the regressions, the relationship should be 
complementary (i.e., the coefficient of the cross-term should be positive). 
On the other hand, the interactive effect between the message and the Internet information 
might be negative. When a vast amount of information is available, information overload may 
result (Lee & Lee, 2004). Simon (1957) noted information consumes attention, which is a 
                                                 
1 Wilson (1997) suggests that information-seeking behavior consists of active search, passive search, passive attention, and 
on-going search, where “passive attention” is defined as “information acquisition may take place without intentional seeking”. 
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scarce resource. Our ability to deploy the knowledge that is relevant to their decision-making 
is severely limited (Simon 2000) as is our capacity for processing information (Miller 1956). 
The amount of information scales faster than the attention of human decision makers who have 
to make decisions about which information has priority, and what will be shunted away (Van 
Knippenberg et al. 2015). Hence, consumers may have to choose between various information 
sources. Therefore, it is also possible that some external information channels may act as 
substitutes for others or as a proxy for the full set of information available. 
Previous studies (Economides et al. 2008; Miravete 2003) suggest that relatively few 
demographic variables are useful predictors of the ability of consumers to make accurate 
decisions. However, the amount of effort a consumer puts into information search and 
processing, and preferences for different information sources depend on a number of factors, 
including consumer characteristics (level of education, level of knowledge, etc.), and the 
market (e.g., how many suppliers there are, and how great the differences between suppliers or 
tariffs are expected to be). As a result, household characteristics can directly or indirectly affect 
consumers’ decision making, and their effects should be controlled to avoid biases in 
estimation. We also consider regional characteristics and time effects.  
Specifically, the demographics that are controlled for include social grade, gender, working 
status, primary language, family size, economic situation (including income and perceived 
financial pressure), age, and educational attainment. In addition, we assume that consumers 
who are active in retail markets more generally have some common characteristics. A variable 
indicating those who have ever participated in other markets is used to control for the common 
personality type. Market engagement might embody a group effect, which is largely realized 
at a regional level and therefore affected by regional feature, so we also control regional 
effects. When a household moves to a new residence, they are very likely to change suppliers 
or tariffs. The surveys do not allow us to distinguish between those who actively switched 
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and those who switched because they moved home, so an indicator for moving to a new house 
is introduced to control for the effect of moving on levels of engagement. When regressing 
with pooled data, year dummies for 2014 and 2016 are included to control for time-varying 
effects. 
3.2. Multivariate probit regressions 
We examine three binary decisions on switching: (a) if households have switched their 
energy supplier (ES); (b) if have changed their energy tariffs (ET); and (c) if they have 
changed their payment method (PM) and are respectively labeled 𝑦𝐸𝑆, 𝑦𝐸𝑇, and 𝑦𝑃𝑀.  
These three dichotomous decisions on market participation are not considered to be 
mutually exclusive since they may be influenced by the same unobserved factors. In other 
words, we assume the unobserved factors influencing the three decisions may be correlated, 
and potential correlation can be positive or negative. If the assumption holds, then modelling 
these decisions separately as a single choice can lead to less-efficient estimates. 
We use a multivariate probit regression (MPR) approach to simultaneously evaluate the 
factors influencing the three decisions (Greene 2008). MPR analysis is characterized by the 
relaxing of the restrictive assumption of mutually exclusive alternatives, which is especially 
suitable for modeling discrete choice situations where individuals are exercising multiple 
choices as opposed to a single discrete choice. The first study introducing a multivariate probit 
model was Ashford and Sowden (1970). Recent examples include Baltas (2004) on the 
selection of multiple brands, and Becker et al. (2017) analyzing car-sharing membership.  
In a MPR, Probabilities of consumer participation in the energy market can be expressed 
as follows,  
 
 15 
 
{
 
 
 
 
𝑃(𝑦𝐸𝑆 = 1|𝑋) = 𝐺1(𝛽1𝑋1 + 𝜀1),   𝑦𝐸𝑠 = 1  𝑖𝑓  𝑈𝑠
∗ > 0     
   
𝑃(𝑦𝐸𝑇 = 1|𝑋) = 𝐺2(𝛽2𝑋2 + 𝜀2),  𝑦𝐸𝑇 = 1  𝑖𝑓  𝑈𝑐
∗ > 0   
𝑃(𝑦𝑃𝑀 = 1|𝑋) = 𝐺3(𝛽3𝑋3 + 𝜀3),  𝑦𝑃𝑀 = 1  𝑖𝑓  𝑈𝑐
∗ > 0 
         (1) 
     𝐸(𝜀𝑖) = 0, 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖) = 1,  𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑖 , 𝜀𝑗) = 𝜌𝑖𝑗 
 
where G(𝛽𝑋)  represents the cumulative distribution function that maps  𝛽𝑋 into the 
response probability. It can be a probit model, by assuming a joint normal distribution of the 
error terms 𝜀𝑖 (Wooldridge 2002). 𝑋1, 𝑋2
 and 𝑋3 are the set of explanatory variables in the 
respective regression. Let the correlation coefficients between the error terms be 𝜌𝑖𝑗 . The null 
hypothesis is 𝜌 = 0, implying the three types of switching behaviors are independent of one 
another. If the null hypothesis is accepted, the probit regressions in a MPR can be estimated 
separately, otherwise, the MPR model is appropriate.  
3.3. Model  
The specific MPRs for estimation can be rewritten as follows,  
 
{
 
 
 
 
𝑦𝐸𝑆=𝑐𝑒𝑠 + 𝛼𝑒𝑠𝐼𝑛𝑓 +𝜃𝑒𝑠𝐸𝑥𝑓 +𝛾𝑒𝑠𝐸𝑥𝑓1𝐸𝑥𝑓2 + 𝛿𝑒𝑠𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝜀 1         
𝑦𝐸𝑇=𝑐𝑒𝑡 + 𝛼𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑓 +𝜃𝑒𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑓 +𝛾𝑒𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑓1𝐸𝑥𝑓2 + 𝛿𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝜀2           
𝑦𝑃𝑀=𝑐𝑝𝑚 + 𝛼𝑝𝑚𝐼𝑛𝑓 +𝜃𝑝𝑚𝐸𝑥𝑓 +𝛾𝑝𝑚𝐸𝑥𝑓1𝐸𝑥𝑓2 + 𝛿𝑝𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝜀3
   (2) 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑓 is a vector of variables describing the internal information and 𝐸𝑥𝑓 is a vector of the 
two external information variables. The parameters 𝛼 measure the effects of consumer beliefs, 
knowledge and awareness of the energy market, corresponding to hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 
respectively. 𝜃 describes the effects of external information on consumer behavior, in line 
with hypotheses H4, H5, and H6, and 𝐸𝑥𝑓1𝐸𝑥𝑓2 is the two-way interaction term between the 
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two sources of external information. The variable 𝛾 captures the effect of the interaction, 
which is negative for a substitutive relation, and positive for a complementary relationship. 
The main parameters of interest are 𝛼, 𝜃, and 𝛾. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 is a vector of control variables. 
4. Data and variables 
As part of the monitoring and evaluation framework introduced as part of its Retail Market 
Review (RMR) reforms, in spring 2014, Ofgem commissioned TNS BMRB to conduct a 
nationally representative face-to-face survey of over 6,000 energy consumers in Great Britain. 
The aim was to contribute towards the establishment of a baseline of consumer attitudes and 
behavior in the early stages of the RMR interventions (TNS 2016). Thereafter, the survey was 
repeated two additional times in 2015 and 2016 to examine changes in these attitudes and 
behaviors. As such, it is one of the very few multi-year nationally representative, publicly 
available surveys of consumers in a major retail market (Burroughs & Rindfleisch, 2002).  
Our analysis is based on the three surveys that were independently conducted from 2014 
to 2016. In other words, the data is not based on a longitudinal survey so the sample 
composition changed for each of the three surveys. Moreover, there were marked changes in 
the prices in the energy market in the UK in the run up to each of the three surveys (which were 
conducted in the spring of each year). Average energy prices increased rapidly from late 2011 
through late 2013 (far outstripping other consumer prices), were stable for most of 2014, before 
falling dramatically in 2015. The issue of energy prices became highly salient in British politics 
with the leader of the main opposition party calling for a freeze on energy prices as one of his 
top priorities (Waddams Price & Zhu 2016; He & Reiner 2017). The changes in the sample 
composition and the market might result in biases when regressing by pooling data. We will 
address this problem in our discussion of the empirical analysis. 
 
4.1. Outcome variables 
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The survey asked households about their past decisions to change gas and electricity 
suppliers. We derive binary outcome variables based on the following three questions.  
 
YES: In last 12 months, have you switched gas/electricity supplier?  
YET: In last 12 months, did you change tariff you were on with your existing gas/electricity 
supplier (without switching supplier)? 
YPM: In the last 12 months, have you changed the payment method with your gas / electricity 
supplier (without switching supplier)? 
 
If the respondent gave a positive response to the question, the corresponding binary 
outcome variable, Y, is assigned a value of 1, 0 otherwise. Additionally, to provide a more 
holistic picture of household engagement, we create a comprehensive indicator, designated 
as ‘active’, by integrating the responses to the three questions above. If a respondent gave a 
positive response to any of them, the binary outcome variable is assigned a value of 1, 0 
otherwise. Given the question framing, it should be noted these three behaviors cannot happen 
at the same time, but they can happen over the same observed period. 
The left-hand panel of Table 1 describes the changes in consumer behavior in British 
energy markets over the three years of the survey. Overall, the annual rate of switching 
suppliers in the UK energy market has fluctuated in a fairly narrow band between 12% and 
15%. The rates of switching tariffs, roughly 14% to 16%, are slightly higher than switching 
suppliers, while the rates of changing payment methods are below 5%. The disparity is 
unsurprising, since whereas there are many suppliers and several tariffs for any given supplier 
at a point in time, changing payment methods is generally a once-and-for-all decision, so that 
a shift to direct debit is likely to be maintained in future switches of tariff or supplier. If we turn 
to the comprehensive indicator of switching behavior, “active”, the overall rates are over a 
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quarter (26%) in all three years. This also indicates that relatively few will have undertaken 
switching across multiple dimensions in a single year.   
The right half panel of the table presents household participation rates, grouped by payment 
method and fuel type. Compared to other households, those paying by direct debit are more 
active in the market overall and in particular show clearly higher participation rates in switching 
ESs and changing ETs.  
 
Table 1 Market participation rates in the last 12 months 
  
All 
Year   Direct debit    Dual-fuel a 
  2014 2015 2016   Y  N   Y N 
Active  
0.2674 0.2634 0.2619 0.2770  0.3150 0.1698  0.2684 0.2959 
(0.443) (0.441) (0.440) (0.448)  (0.465) (0.376)  (0.443) (0.457) 
Switch ESs  
0.1338 0.1335 0.1235 0.1444  0.1489 0.1036  0.1352 0.1320 
(0.341) (0.340) (0.329) (0.352)  (0.356) (0.305)  (0.342) (0.339) 
Change ETs  
0.1525 0.1405 0.1587 0.1588  0.1966 0.0607  0.1582 0.1804 
(0.360) (0.348) (0.366) (0.366)  (0.397) (0.239)  (0.365) (0.385) 
Change PMs b  
0.0431 0.0494 0.0410 0.0386 
 
0.0422 0.0450 
 
0.0385 0.0553 
(0.203) (0.217) (0.198) (0.193)   (0.201) (0.207)   (0.192) (0.229) 
Obs. 18041 6151 5934 5956   12192 5272   9456 909 
Notes: The standard deviations are reported in parentheses.  
(a) Data for dual fuel users are not available for 2014. This type of behavior refers to comparisons of energy tariffs in general; therefore, it 
includes any comparison of tariffs with their current supplier or other suppliers.  
(b) When customers compare tariffs of different suppliers, they are actually comparing the suppliers.  
 
The surveys did not ask explicitly whether respondents switched to have their gas and 
electricity provided by the same supplier in a given year, so being on a dual-fuel contract might 
be a result of prior engagement in previous years. Depending on payment method, such 
arrangements can offer savings of 8% - 23% (CMA 2016). If households are classified by their 
switching patterns, dual-fuel households are slightly more active in changing supplier, but less 
active in changing tariff than others. By inquiring as to the last time respondents switched 
supplier/tariff and the factors that mattered most in making such a switch, a dual-fuel contract 
can be treated more like a motivation for switching rather than as an outcome.  
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We might expect that household switching behavior may be positively correlated with 
payment method and/or patterns of fuel use, and the correlation might differ depending on the 
type of participation.  
4.2. Information variables 
Across the three surveys, a large minority (37.6%) of respondents found it difficult to 
compare different tariffs for electricity or gas, and a similar percentage (38.2%) felt they were 
not familiar with the range of tariffs available. These numbers imply that limited knowledge of 
various options and consumer uncertainty are likely to be barriers to participating in the market. 
Thus, improving communications in this area may help raise household switching rates.  
An indicator for cognition of energy tariff differences, labeled “n_belief”, is created based 
on the question on whether respondents agree with the statement there are no real differences 
between suppliers in the prices they charge.  
An indicator of energy expenditure knowledge, labeled “knowspd”, is created based on 
the question “how much do you spend on your home energy?” The variable is assigned 1 for 
respondents that provided their consumption or energy expenditure data, zero otherwise. 
Proceeding in this way, we can measure the impact of respondents not knowing their 
expenditures compared to those who do know (or at least claim to know) their expenditure 
levels.  
The indicator for energy tariff knowledge, labeled “familiar”, is based on the question on 
whether consumers are familiar with tariffs available from energy suppliers in general. If the 
respondent gave a positive answer the variable equals 1, 0 otherwise.  
For Hypothesis 4, we explore the impact of supplier messages. The questionnaire asks 
respondents if they recalled having received any of the following messages from their suppliers 
over the past 12 months: (a) an annual summary or review; (b) at least one bill or direct debit / 
prepayment statement; (c) a price increase notification letter; or (d) a letter informing them that 
 20 
 
their fixed term tariff is coming to an end. We created a variable for message by integrating the 
responses to the four statements above. If the response to any of the statements is positive, the 
variable equals 1, 0 otherwise.  
To test the impact of the Internet information, we construct an indicator, labeled “reg_int”, 
to identify regular internet users, where ‘regular’ refers to daily usage.  
4.3. Variable definitions 
Table 2 presents the variable definitions. First, we list the dependent variables, reflecting 
past consumer activities in the energy market. Next are the five explanatory variables of 
interest. We then present the control variables to address demographics: age, education, income 
and region are all categorical variables, and the intervals for each of them cannot be considered 
equally spaced. Specifically, age is treated as a three-category variable in ascending order, 
indicating younger (under 35), middle aged (35 to 64) and older respondents (65 and over).  
The income variable, labeled “income_n”, has 11 categories. As is typical in most public 
surveys (Riphahn & Serfling, 2005), when asked about income, the respondents that refused or 
otherwise declined accounted for as much as 30% of the sample. Simply excluding these 
observations from the sample may significantly reduce the precision of analysis. We put these 
observations into one category and take it as the reference category for income.1 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Variable definitions  
                                                 
1 Choice of the reference category of income does not generate any changes in estimates of other variables, except the income 
categories remaining in the regression. To illustrate this, in Table A-2 of the Appendix we report the results of the baseline 
model, where the 10th income level is taken as the reference category. 
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Variable Coding Definition 
switch ES 1 Yes; 0 No Switched energy suppliers in last 12 months 
change ET 1 Yes; 0 No Changed energy tariffs in last 12 months  
change PM 1 Yes; 0 No Changed payment method in last 12 months 
n_belief  1 Agree; 0 Don’t agree;  
Agree with statement there are no real differences between suppliers in 
the prices they charge 
knowspd 1 provide an answer; 0 missing value | 
refused | don’t know 
Can specify their approximate expenditure on home energy (or 
consumption). 
familiar 1 Yes; 0 No Whether familiar with tariffs available from energy suppliers in general 
reg_int 1 frequent user; 0 others Whether customers use Internet roughly every day  
message 1 Yes; 0 No Whether customers recall receiving any supplier communication (annual 
summary, bill, PIN, EOFTN) a 
lenspd Annual levels Logarithm of annual energy expenditure, continuous  
spd_n 0, don’t know; 1~5, quintiles (where 1 is 
bottom 20%, 5 is top 20%) 
Categories of energy expenditure 
switchother 1 Yes; 0 No Any switching in other markets in the last 12 months 
socgrade 1 AB | C1; 0 C2 | DE Social class 
male 1 Male; 0 Female Gender 
work 1 Full/Part time; 0 others Working status 
language 1 Yes; 0 No  English as the first or main language 
movehouse 1 Yes; 0 No Whether customers moved house in the last 12 months 
numbhh Exact number Number of household members 
finstr 1 Agree; 0 Don’t agree; Whether customers agree that financially things are a bit of a struggle. 
income_n 
 
 
 
  
1. Under £5000;    2. £5000-£9999;  
3. £10000-£14999;  4. £15000-£19999;  
5. £20000-£24999;  6. £25000-£39999;  
7. £35000-£49999;  8. £45000-£59999;  
9. £60000-£79999;  10. £80000+;  
11. Refused | don't know| no work 
Category of household annual income (£) 
 
 
 
  
age 1. <35; 2. 35-64; 3. 65+ Age of respondent  
edu 
 
 
  
1 No formal education;  
2 GCSE, GNVQ, ONC;  
3 A levels, HND/HNC;  
4 Professional qualification | undergrad 
degree | post grad 
Education level 
 
 
  
region 1 England; 2 Wales; 3 Scotland Region 
TCR b 
 
 
1 Yes; 0 No 
  
Energy suppliers are now required to provide a Tariff Comparison Rate 
(TCR) for each tariff they offer. Do customers recall seeing a message 
like this? 
dual fuel b 1 Yes; 0 No Same energy supplier for both gas and electricity? 
direct debit 1 Yes; 0 No Are gas and electricity paid by direct debit? 
everswitch 1 Yes; 0 No Has the household ever switched gas or electricity supplier (without 
moving), prior to last 12 months? 
Notes: (a) PIN is a price increase notification letter; and EOFTN (end of fixed term notice) is a letter to inform customers that their fixed term 
tariff is coming to an end. (b) Not available for 2014.   
 
In addition to the income variable, we introduce another variable to control for the effect 
of household finances, labeled “finstr". The variable was created based on the responses to the 
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question on whether consumers agree “financially things are a bit of a struggle for me” and 
therefore reflects households’ perception of financial hardship whether or not that is reflected 
in more ‘objective’ income data. The two variables are correlated with a coefficient of -0.236. 
We include both variables in the regressions for two reasons: first, income may affect other 
independent variables, such as education and social grade, so it can be regarded as a 
confounding variable and its effect should be controlled for, regardless of whether it results in 
a collinearity problem or not. Second, the ‘finstr’ variable has the advantage in that it captures 
how households perceive a relative change in energy expenditure (and/or commodity prices) 
with respect to their income. 
Finally, the bottom panel displays the variables that will be used to investigate robustness. 
TCR is used as an alternative to the ‘message’ variable and ‘everswitch’ to indicate whether 
the household had ever switched supplier prior to the last 12 months. 
4.4. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 presents the statistical descriptions for the variables included in the analysis. 
Most households (84%) claim they know how much they spend on energy, but only 38% 
knew about energy tariffs, and 43% did not think there are any differences between the energy 
prices available in retail markets although 80% had received messages from their own 
suppliers. Clearly, a relatively small fraction can be considered as knowledgeable or aware 
of energy markets. In the three years of the survey, only 63-68% of respondents were daily 
Internet users, which is smaller than ONS (2017b) estimates of 78% for 2015, although this 
figure is for daily or near daily Internet use. 
Obviously, Internet access and supplier messages are the main ways households can 
acquire external information. By contrast, only about 20% of households had some 
knowledge of TCRs.  
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics by participant type 
  All respondents  Active group Non-active group 
 Obs. Mean (SD) min max  Obs. Mean (SD) Obs. Mean (SD) 
n_belief 17034 0.432  (0.495) 0 1  4697 0.340  (0.474) 12337  0.466  (0.499) 
knowspd 18041 0.841  (0.365) 0 1  4824 0.900  (0.300) 13217  0.820  (0.384) 
Spd_n 18041 2.475  (1.685) 0 5  4824 2.678  (1.590) 13217 2.401  (1.412) 
enspd 15182 1234  (817) 1 28800  4344 1247  (816) 10,838 1229  (817) 
familiar 18041 0.382  (0.486) 0 1  4824 0.535  (0.499) 13217  0.327  (0.469) 
reg_int 18035 0.652  (0.476) 0 1  4822 0.655  (0.475) 13213  0.651  (0.477) 
message 17268 0.815  (0.388) 0 1  4680 0.860  (0.347) 12588  0.799  (0.401) 
switchother 18041 0.278  (0.448) 0 1  4824 0.377  (0.485) 13217  0.242  (0.428) 
socgrade 18041 0.441  (0.496) 0 1  4824 0.543  (0.498) 13217  0.403  (0.491) 
male 18041 0.480  (0.500) 0 1  4824 0.474  (0.499) 13217  0.482  (0.500) 
work 18041 0.431  (0.495) 0 1  4824 0.479  (0.500) 13217  0.414  (0.493) 
language 18041 0.904  (0.295) 0 1  4824 0.929  (0.257) 13217  0.895  (0.306) 
movehouse 17967 0.110  (0.313) 0 1  4807 0.160  (0.367) 13160  0.092  (0.290) 
numbhh 18041 2.362  (1.516) 1 64  4824 2.513  (1.327) 13217  2.306  (1.575) 
finstr 17797 0.359  (0.480) 0 1  4777 0.324  (0.468) 13020  0.372  (0.483) 
income_n 18041 6.648  (3.607) 1 11  4824 6.744  (3.333) 13217  6.613  (3.702) 
age 18041 2.144  (0.724) 1 3  4824 2.076  (0.705) 13217  2.168  (0.729) 
edu 17778 2.545  (1.136) 1 4  4787 2.801  (1.091) 12991  2.450  (1.138) 
region 18041 1.239  (0.604) 1 3  4824 1.218  (0.581) 13217  1.246  (0.612)   
TCR a 10911 0.198  (0.398) 0  1   2993  0.316  (0.465) 7918  0.153  (0.360) 
Dual fuel a 10366 0.912  (0.283) 0 1  2807 0.904  (0.294) 7558  0.915  (0.278) 
Direct debit 17464 0.698  (0.459)   0 1  4735 0.811  (0.392) 12729  0.656  (0.475) 
everswitch 16362 0.461  (0.498) 0 1  3255 0.513  (0.500) 13107  0.448  (0.497) 
Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. (a) Data are not available for 2014.   
(a) The value of variable EnSpd is obtained based on two question, the first was "Approximately how much do you spend on home 
energy?", which was followed by another question indicating the expenditure duration (weekly, fortnightly, every four weeks, a calendar 
month, quarterly, twice yearly, and annual). Some of observations show a very high level of annual energy expenditure. For in stance, 14 
observations of the sample show a level of annual expenditure over 10,000 pounds. We noticed that most of these abnormal observations 
have a claimed duration of a month, and therefore the possibility of reporting errors exist (e.g., the respondent reported a correct figure of 
annual expenditure and wrong code of duration. However, this would not change the conclusions of this study, since the proportion of 
such seemly abnormal observations is very low; moreover, the variable EnSpd is only used once in the robustness test (see table A-4 of 
the appendix). 
(b) There are four observations with a claimed family size of over 20 household members, which seems unusual. However, this problem 
can hardly cause an estimation bias because these observations accounted for a very low proportion in the sample and therefore their effect 
can be ignored. 
 
On the right-hand side of the table, the observations are split into two groups – active 
consumers and non-active consumers – according to whether households had changed 
supplier, tariff or payment method. Active participants are more likely to believe that there 
are differences in the prices that suppliers charge, and more likely to claim to know more 
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about their energy expenditure. Over half of participants (53.5%) express familiarity with 
energy tariffs available in the market, compared to one-third (32.7%) of non-participants. 
Almost half (46.6 %) of non-participants do not believe there is a difference in the tariffs 
available compared to only one third (34%) of active participants. With respect to supplier 
messages, slightly more market participants (86.0%) recall receiving such messages 
compared to those not actively engaged (79.9%). Further, almost one third (31.6%) of active 
participants were aware of the TCR price comparison tool, which is double the rate of non-
participants (15.3%). These comparisons suggest that participants are far better informed 
about the energy market than non-participants. 
Overall, about 70% of the households pay energy bills by direct debit, although the 
popularity of direct debit differs between groups by as much as 15.5 percent. 
Demographically, active consumers in the energy market are more likely to be those who are 
also active in other product markets, with a higher social grade (AB and C1), female, younger, 
have a job, a larger family, higher educational attainment, face less financial pressure, use 
English as their main language, and have moved home. 
A large majority of the respondents describe English as their first language (90.4%) and 
live in England (85%). This corresponds well to the most recent data from the UK Office of 
National Statistics (ONS 2017a), which found English was the main language of 92.3% of 
the population in England and Wales and the population of England was 84.1% of the UK 
population.  
There might be concern over possible multicollinearity problems, since there are many 
explanatory variables, particularly the demographic controls. Our correlation tests find that 
the absolute values of the correlations between independent variables are all less than 0.7, the 
threshold value that indicates a serious co-linearity that could interfere with regression results 
(Lind et al. 2002). Moreover, most coefficients have an absolute value below 0.1, suggesting 
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weak correlations. Based on these results, we can conclude that multicollinearity problems 
that can interfere with the estimation are not serious. 
Moreover, the correlation coefficients between the variables, “n_belief”, “knowspd” and 
“familiar”, are all below 0.1, indicating the internal information that they capture have little 
homogeneity, which means they measure different aspect of respondent’s cognition of the 
market. The variable “message” shows a positive correlation with the variable “TCR”, with 
a correlation coefficient of 0.166. This implies that while they are distinguishable from one 
another, there is a certain degree of overlap in the information they convey.  
5. Results 
Since the data was generated from three independent surveys rather than a longitudinal 
survey, we first discuss the results from pooled estimation and use heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors to deal with possible heteroscedasticity problems. To investigate if the 
regression model is heterogeneous with time, we also report the results from cross-section 
estimation.  
5.1. Results from the baseline model 
Table 4 displays the results from the MPRs with pooled data, which is based on 
seemingly-unrelated regressions (SUR) because our multiple DVs for ES, ET and PM, are 
not independent of one another (an approach similar to that adopted in Valsesia et al. (2016)). 
Hereafter, we take the model in the left-hand panel as the baseline model. Specification 1 on 
the right-hand side is a small modification of the baseline model. The difference between the 
two specifications is the message variable. The baseline model uses the variable “message” 
to represent the information offered by the consumer’s current supplier. The other one uses 
TCR to measure the information provided by one’s own supplier or other energy suppliers.  
We first discuss the results from the baseline model. A lack of belief in tariff difference 
reduces the probability of changing ES and ET, but does not affect the probability of changing 
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PM. In the equations on switching ES and changing ETs, the parameters of the belief variable 
are similar in size and consistent in sign. For the other two internal information variables, 
‘knowspd’ and ‘familiar’, the effects are all positive, and this is consistent across different 
switching behaviors.  
 
Table 4 Estimation results with pooled MPRs  
  Baseline a   Spec.1 b 
 YES YET YPM 
 YES YET YPM 
n_belief -0.3594*** -0.1315*** -0.0220  -0.4095*** -0.1332*** -0.0681 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.037)  (0.035) (0.033) (0.049) 
knowSpd 0.1362*** 0.2584*** 0.1480**  0.1662*** 0.3040*** 0.0639 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.058)  (0.052) (0.053) (0.072) 
familiar 0.2998*** 0.4530*** 0.1104***  0.2601*** 0.4270*** 0.0548 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.036)  (0.034) (0.033) (0.048) 
reg_int 0.1842** 0.1668* 0.2407**  0.3693*** 0.3396*** 0.1659** 
 (0.072) (0.091) (0.110)  (0.056) (0.055) (0.073) 
message -0.2643*** 0.1969** 0.1025     
 (0.069) (0.084) (0.107)     
reg_int×messg 0.1135 0.2429** -0.0085     
 (0.078) (0.095) (0.119)     
TCR     0.0100 0.4079*** 0.0194 
     (0.099) (0.086) (0.141) 
reg_int×TCR     0.102 0.146 0.1291 
     (0.107) (0.094) (0.152) 
rho rho12: 0.211
***; rho13: 0.334
*** ; rho23: 0.320
***  rho12: 0.199
***; rho13: 0.333
*** ; rho23: 0.327
*** 
Wald chi2 973   660 
Controls & year dummy Y  Y 
Obs. 16128   9859 
Notes: The MPRs were estimated using the Maximum Likelihood method with seemingly unrelated regressions (ML-based SUR). The numbers 
in brackets are robust standard errors, adjusted for heteroscedasticity. *, **, and *** represents significance of 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, 
respectively. All equations include a constant term, and same demographic controls such as switchother, socgrade, male, work, language, 
movehouse, numbhh, finstr, income_n, age, edu and region.  
(a) Table A-1 in the appendix provides the full results for the baseline model.  
(b) Spec.1 is based on pooled data for 2015-16 since data for TCR was not available for 2014 (TCRs only became available in 2014).  
 
As shown by the results in the following sections, when additional variables are included 
in regressions, or the regressions are implemented with cross-section data, the results regarding 
changing PM show poor robustness. This is hardly surprising since households that reported 
changing PMs comprise less than 5% of the sample. The number of respondents who switched 
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PM is so small (240~304 in each year) that it is hard to generate efficient estimates. Our 
discussions thereafter focus on switching ESs and ETs.  
The findings presented above provide support for hypotheses H1, H2 and H3 on beliefs, 
knowledge and awareness of the energy market respectively. A lack of belief in tariff 
differences, which means expecting no gains from participating in the energy market, would 
have a negative influence on switching behaviors. Both professed knowledge of energy 
expenditure and familiarity with energy tariffs play a positive role.  
To test our statement on expenditure, we regressed four variants of the baseline model by 
including variables to capture the level of claimed expenditure as detailed in the Appendix A.1. 
Overall, knowledge of expenditure is better predictor for switching decisions, compared to 
expenditure levels; indeed, there is no clear relationship between expenditure level and 
switching (Table A-4). Thus, unlike Six et al. (2017), we find the level of expenditure on 
electricity has no influence on switching decision nor intention, rather, our analysis emphasizes 
what matters is claimed knowledge of expenditure, not the expenditure level itself. 
Consistent with our expectations, the Internet variable exhibits a positive relationship for 
all three types of switching behaviors, regardless of the model specification. This provides 
strong support for hypothesis H4 that Internet-based information can promote consumer 
engagement in the energy market.  
As for the Message variable, its impact varies with the form of participation. There is a 
negative association with ES switching; that is, a supplier message can increase consumer 
loyalty to their current supplier. In fact, as seen in other specifications presented in the 
following subsections, the negative effect of this Message variable on ES switching is strongly 
robust, regardless of model specification. Though somewhat unexpected, it can be interpreted 
by the message source and the difference in uncertainties between switching ETs and ESs. 
When a consumer receives communication from their supplier, he or she may perceive the 
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supplier as being more solicitous and engaged, further deepening the consumer ‘relationship’ 
with their supplier and leading to the perception that their supplier is more trustworthy, which 
would discourage switching to other suppliers. For convenience, we call this “incumbent bias”.  
Moreover, consumers are generally more familiar with their own supplier than with other 
suppliers and find it easier to compare between offers from the same supplier versus offers from 
different suppliers. As a result, changing suppliers may be perceived as riskier than changing 
tariffs, because the former is seen as involving greater uncertainties. Thus, messages from a 
single source do not provide a basis for comparison between suppliers and cannot reduce 
uncertainty so the ‘message’ would have a negative relationship with supplier switching.  
By contrast, if the above logic holds, then the ‘message’ variable should have a positive 
effect on changing tariffs, because the information contained in the message from the current 
supplier can help the consumer differentiate between a supplier’s different tariffs. The estimate 
of the effect that the message variable has on changing tariffs (ET) confirms our reasoning, 
with a significantly positive coefficient. 
Since an “incumbent bias” is produced when receiving supplier messages from a single 
source, it could be corrected by diversifying information sources. The interaction of Internet 
information with message should therefore be positive. We find the interactive effect between 
Internet information and the message on changing tariffs is positive and significant, which 
confirms Hypothesis H6 that the message, combined with efforts to process information 
promotes engagement. In contrast to the cross term in the ET equation, the parameter of 
the cross term in the ES equation is not significant, and smaller in magnitude. Again, we 
attribute this to the greater uncertainty and complexity of switching suppliers. As shown in the 
following subsections, this argument is supported by results from other specifications – 
the cross term between the Internet and the message variables exhibits a consistently stronger 
effect for changing tariffs than changing suppliers. 
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As suggested above, supplier messages can have a negative effect on switching ESs 
because the information it measures is from single source – their current supplier. A natural 
question to ask is whether the effect on switching ESs is positive if the messages are from 
various suppliers rather than a single supplier. We introduce the variable “TCR”, to represent 
Tariff Comparison Rates, reflecting the effects of information from suppliers in general.  
TCRs, as a comparison tool, facilitate greater consumer scrutiny of their energy 
consumption and spending, and comparison between suppliers and tariffs. The 2015 and 2016 
questionnaires asked respondents if they had seen any TCRs. Since TCRs have been mainly 
provided by price comparison websites (PCWs), their effectiveness might be associated with 
effort put into online information searching. Thus, we use the interaction of TCR with the 
Internet variable to identify such engagement.  
 We turn now to the right-hand panel of Table 4, where the results of the MPR from 
including TCR and using 2015-16 pooled data, are displayed. For the first four variables, we 
see the coefficients resemble the ones in the reference model, both in terms of the direction of 
the relationship and significance level. In spite of the changes in magnitude of the parameters, 
our conclusions about hypotheses H1, H2, H3 and H4 still hold.  
Consider the coefficient of TCR. As expected, its effect is positive for all three choices, 
but only significant for changing tariffs. Parameters of the cross-term between TCR with 
Internet use are positive, but not significant in all equations.1 The coefficient of TCR is positive 
because the “incumbent bias” resulting from a single message source disappears. The cross-
term coefficients are not significant, which suggests that online information does not strengthen 
the effectiveness of the variable ‘TCR’. We reason that since TCRs are provided online, 
measuring access to TCRs has covered the efforts involved in online information searching for 
the TCRs.  
                                                 
1 The conclusions on TCR based on pooled estimation are consistent with that from cross-section estimation (see Table A-3).  
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An important assumption embodied in the baseline model is that the variances in the error 
terms are the same for all observations. The implication is that households are identical in 
seeking, understanding and processing information in retail markets, conditional on individual 
socio-demographic characteristics. According to the statistical analysis presented in Section 4, 
household participation rates in energy markets vary by fuel type and payment method. This is 
particularly visible between households paying by direct debit and others. Accordingly, we 
included additional variables to control for the effects of payment method and fuel type to 
investigate whether ignoring them could result in clear changes in other variables. The results 
(Table A-5) confirm that the previous findings about the effects of information on switching 
tariffs and suppliers are robust (see Appendix A.2 for detailed discussion).  
5.2. Cross-sectional estimations 
Using cross-sectional data and dropping the year dummies, we re-estimated the MPRs 
with the baseline model. The results are reported in the left-hand panel of Table 5. Our 
discussions focus on switching behavior for both suppliers and tariffs.  
By comparing the cross section results, not only the magnitudes but also even the signs of 
some parameters change. For instance, in the ES equations, the variable “knowspd” is not 
significant in 2014 in both ES and ET equations. Only in the cross-sectional estimation of 2015, 
does internet use reveal a significantly positive effect on both switching supplier and tariff (for 
2014). This might be associated with the information shock of introducing mandatory 
comparison tools in April 2014 (just after the 2014 survey was completed), when most of these 
tools became accessible online. 
In the ES and ET equations, the signs of the variables are all in agreement across the cross-
sections and consistent with the pooled estimations found using the baseline model. The 
changes in cross-section estimates suggest the association between information search and 
participating in energy markets can be influenced by changes in the external environment. 
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Estimation with pooling data mixes the dynamics in the market, to a certain extent, by averaging 
effects over the observed period. In spite of that, the main conclusions emerging from the 
pooled baseline model still hold for switching suppliers and tariffs, given the cofounding 
influence of other variables being controlled. 
 
Table 5 Results from cross-section estimation 
 
MPR  Approximately linear regression 
2014  2015  2016   2014  2015  2016  
YES n_belief -0.2771
*** -0.4283*** -0.4038***  -0.0544*** -0.0793*** -0.0828*** 
   (0.043) (0.049) (0.050)  (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
 knowspd 0.0967 0.1257 * 0.2033***  0.0140 0.0227* 0.0371*** 
   (0.064) (0.074) (0.076)  (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) 
 familiar 0.3189*** 0.2674*** 0.3122***  0.0687*** 0.0547*** 0.0706*** 
   (0.043) (0.047) (0.047)  (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) 
 reg_int 0.0472 0.4905*** 0.0201  0.0084 0.0975*** 0.0007 
   (0.116) (0.139) (0.127)  (0.022) (0.024) (0.028) 
 message -0.1331 -0.3833*** -0.3421***  -0.0180 -0.0414** -0.0626*** 
   (0.109) (0.141) (0.118)  (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) 
 reg_int×message 0.0369 0.1070 0.2897**  0.0018 -0.0244 0.0535* 
  (0.125) (0.154) (0.138)  (0.023) (0.024) (0.029) 
YET n_belief -0.1191
*** -0.1249*** -0.1334***  -0.0278*** -0.0306*** -0.0313*** 
   (0.043) (0.045) (0.048)  (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) 
 knowspd 0.2076*** 0.2450*** 0.3502***  0.0351*** 0.0490*** 0.0639*** 
   (0.068) (0.071) (0.079)  (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) 
 familiar 0.4049*** 0.4789*** 0.4942***  0.0900*** 0.1185*** 0.1191*** 
   (0.043) (0.044) (0.047)  (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
 reg_int 0.1351 0.3408** 0.0405  0.0113 0.0300 * 0.0030 
   (0.147) (0.171) (0.160)  (0.016) (0.017) (0.022) 
 message 0.1936 0.2652 * 0.1394  0.0130 0.0135* 0.0059 
   (0.137) (0.160) (0.142)  (0.013) (0.009) (0.019) 
 reg_int×message 0.2242 * 0.1351 0.3746**  0.0563*** 0.0696*** 0.0951*** 
  (0.115) (0.178) (0.168)  (0.017) (0.020) (0.023) 
YPM n_belief 0.0229 -0.0651 -0.0678 
 0.0015 -0.0052 -0.0041 
   (0.057) (0.065) (0.071)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 knowspd 0.2499** 0.0369 0.1342  0.0150** 0.0007 0.0051 
   (0.099) (0.094) (0.110)  (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
 familiar 0.1470** 0.0967 0.0831  0.0156*** 0.0088 0.0064 
   (0.057) (0.065) (0.069)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 reg_int 0.2969 0.2891 0.1299  0.0112 0.0125 0.0057 
   (0.189) (0.192) (0.191)  (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) 
 message 0.2110 0.1536 -0.0969  0.0084 0.0054 -0.0069 
   (0.188) (0.189) (0.178)  (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) 
 reg_int×message -0.0580 -0.1301 0.1632  0.0078 -0.0021 0.0134 
  (0.205) (0.209) (0.207)  (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) 
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rho rho12: 0.209
***;  rho13: 0.344
***;  rho23:0.305
***  rho12: 0.090
***; rho12: 0.132
***; rho23: 0.108
*** 
Wald chi2 346 381 316  334 446 337 
controls Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Obs.     6142 5290 4696  6142 5290 4696 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results for the baseline model, using cross-sectional data and dropping the year dummies; the remaining 
control variables are the same as in Table 4. 
 
Our findings provide evidence to support hypotheses H1, H2 and H3. The conclusions on 
the internal information regarding switching ESs and ETs are consistent across different 
specifications, no matter using pooled data or cross-section data. For specific types of switching 
behavior, effect size of the same variable of internal information does not distinguish much 
between specifications. The only exception is that the effect of energy expenditure knowledge 
on switching suppliers is not significant in 2015. 
With regards to external information, hypotheses H4, H5 and H6 hold, conditional on 
specific types of participation and changes in the market. The empirical association between 
the message and ES switching behavior seem to provide evidence contrary to the initial 
hypothesis H5. We have provided evidence (and an argument) that the effects of the current 
supplier’s message differ from messages offered by other suppliers. Hypothesis H5 thus might 
better be divided into two: 5a - Messages from existing energy suppliers encourage consumers to 
switch tariffs but discourages them from switching suppliers. Supplier message and Internet 
information are complementary, conditionally. The complementarity depends on information 
source, participation type and the market. For single-source supplier messages, which can offer 
only limited information and which will be perceived as biased, greater online search efforts 
can increase the positive effect of the message on household participation in energy market. 
Based on the findings described above, we conclude that external information is the primary 
source of evidence leading to changes in household decision-making over time.  
5.3. Further discussion 
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Just as in a general probit model, the relationship between the probability and the 
predictors is non-linear, so the magnitude of the parameters from the probit model is not equal 
to the marginal effect of variable on the probability (Greene 2008). In order to 
quantitatively interpret the results of the MPR model, we make use of the estimation results 
from linear simultaneous regressions to derive an approximation of the marginal effects. Of 
course, several problems arise from this approximation. The commonly recognized drawback 
is that the estimated probabilities with linear regressions can never have the typically S-
shaped distribution function in a probit model, therefore, the fitted probabilities can go below 
zero or above one (Lewbel et al. 2012). However, even accepting the weaknesses, the linear 
approximation model often seems to provide good estimates of the partial effects on the 
response probabilities near the center of the distribution of 𝑋 (Wooldridge 2002). 
The right-hand panel of Table 5 displays the results the above described linear 
approximation of the switching model, based on cross-section data. The coefficients reflect 
the partial effect on the probability to have switched due to a one unit change or due to the 
change from zero to one in the independent variables. Comparing the linear model with the 
cross-section model, we find they result in almost the same significance levels, and fully 
consistent parameter signs.  
What do these results suggest about our hypotheses? As an illustration, consider the results 
regarding switching ESs, for the cross-sectional data from 2016. A lack of belief in differences 
in energy tariffs leads to a decrease of 8.28% in the probability of switching. A household’s 
knowledge of its energy expenditure yields a higher probability of switching suppliers by 
3.71%, while familiarity with energy tariffs increases the probability of switching by 7.06%. 
For 2016, the Internet variable is not significant, but can affect switching behavior via 
its interaction with Message. For consumers who do not regularly search for information 
online, receiving messages from the current supplier reduces their probability of switching to 
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other suppliers by over 6%. By contrast, for users who often get online, receiving supplier 
messages reduces the possibility of switching by less than 1%. 
Finally, although appraising the information variables may be imperfect, measurement 
problems do not weaken the reliability of the main results. If anything, the impact of Message 
and its interactive influence with Internet information may be understated. There are two 
reasons for the possible underestimation. First, the Internet has become the main channel of 
information communication. Part of the supplier messages conveyed by the Internet has been 
included in the variable for Internet information. Second, the Message variable was based on 
household awareness of supplier message rather than understanding and processing. The impact 
of any information received, without processing could be greatly discounted. Although the 
measurement problem may lead to a bias in the estimation results, it does not change our basic 
conclusions regarding external information sources. 
So far, our discussions have focused on the role of information on switching behavior. But 
the estimation results of alternative models show that some of the socioeconomic covariates 
proposed in our analysis present significant influences on household participation in energy 
market. For the sake of simplicity, we present the complete results of the socioeconomic 
covariates of the baseline model, in Table A-1 of the Appendix. Here we only discuss the main 
findings.  
In most of our alternative models, social grade, income, financial pressure, age, education 
and region have significant influence on switching behaviors, but the estimated parameters are 
not robust, as the signs and significance levels change with model specification and type of 
participation.  
With regard to changing ESs and ETs, the variables related to language, gender, work, and 
family size are robust in the different models. Consumers with English as their main language 
and who have a larger family are more likely to be active in the market, other things being 
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equal. Males or those not in employment, are less likely to be active in the market, all else being 
equal. 
Respondents who have switched in other product markets are more likely to be active in 
the energy markets, compared with the non-switchers. This conclusion holds for all three types 
of switching behavior and is robust in different models. The finding about switchers of other 
products highlights the potential importance of switching experience in other circumstances, 
which is consistent with the conclusion of other studies (He & Reiner 2017; Six et al. 2017). 
Activities in other retail markets provide consumers the opportunity to learn how to process 
information, compare offers and choose the best supplier; these advantages may lead to 
increased capability of switching. This finding also highlights that inactive consumers are not 
only losing out in energy markets but in a host of other markets such as insurance, personal 
banking, broadband and mobile phones where the gains from switching may be even larger and 
that the nature of these consumers may be difficult to alter. Moreover, switching rates in energy 
markets is higher than other competitive markets such as mobile, broadband or retail banking 
although lower than car insurance (Ofcom 2016).  
6. Conclusions 
Household participation in energy markets is a complex social issue affected by multiple 
factors including cognitive, environmental and psychological constraints. Our analysis focuses 
on the impacts of information and knowledge on three decisions regarding market participation: 
(a) switching to an alternative electricity and/or gas supplier; (b) switching to an alternative 
electricity and/or gas tariff; and (c) changing payment methods for household energy bills.  
Our study contributes to a growing evidence base on the factors influencing household 
participation in energy markets and more widely on questions of customer stickiness and brand 
loyalty (such as Ping 1993, Mattila 2001, and Wolter et al. 2017). ‘External’ information and 
‘internal’ knowledge produce different effects on participation of households in energy market, 
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and different “external” information are complementary in promoting participation. The 
conclusions are robust with regard to decisions over switching suppliers and tariffs. Difficulty 
in reaching conclusions on payment method is unsurprising, because of the small numbers 
switching payment method over the three years of the survey – most consumers on direct debit 
will have made a once-and-for-all switch long before 2014.  
Belief in energy tariff differences reflects consumer understanding of market competition, 
particularly expectation of the gains from participating in markets. Our results confirm the 
initial hypothesis that a lack of belief in differences across energy tariffs reduces the probability 
of participation. These findings suggest that improving consumer understanding of the range 
of available tariffs would be helpful in promoting greater engagement.  
If consumers are unclear about their own energy spending, they will be uncertain about 
how much savings they can obtain from switching to a new supplier. We find that knowing 
one’s own household energy expenditure, and familiarity with general energy tariffs are both 
related to a greater probability of participation. In that sense, targeted information campaigns 
may be effective. Households that have learned about their energy spending still may not know 
how to go about comparing and switching, which might prevent them from taking further 
actions such as changing tariffs or suppliers. Various forms of social interaction can raise 
knowledge of how to switch, and therefore motivate engagement in the market.  
Our study provides evidence that receiving messages from their existing energy provider 
may discourage households from switching suppliers. Meanwhile, the positive effect of Internet 
information reveals the importance of information and knowledge, since Internet access 
provides consumers with an important channel for obtaining information related both to their 
energy spending and to comparing deals. 
Due to the differences in reliability between various sources of information, the 
imbalanced effects of information have implications for household participation in the market. 
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For example, messages offered by a single source and other offline information (for instance, 
opinions from friends and colleagues) may be incomplete, leading to a bias in household 
decision making. Internet-based information (price comparison websites for example) can 
deliver relatively accurate and comprehensive information, which in turn helps prospective 
switchers to make the right choices and thereby promotes market competition.  
We find external information clearly has different impacts on different forms of 
participation. In particular, the interaction between Internet information and supplier messages 
produces a stronger effect on changing tariffs than changing suppliers. We conclude that the 
uncertainty and complexity in changing suppliers is larger than in changing tariffs. This finding 
highlights the potential importance of targeted information with regards to specific forms of 
engagement.  
Our results also provide evidence that different forms of participation are significantly 
related to each other. Overall, the level of activity in changing tariffs is higher than that of 
changing suppliers and payment method, although the level of specific forms of participation 
varies by group. For example, all else being equal, households that pay their energy bills by 
direct debit, are less likely to switch suppliers and more likely to change tariffs, compared to 
other households dual-fuel users are more likely to switch suppliers and payment methods.  
We find the strength of information effect varies by year, which may reflect shifts in the 
wider social and political climate, given the fact that the effect is particularly strong in 2015 
when energy markets were particularly newsworthy. We reason this variation might be due to 
changes in policy and the rapid shift in energy prices and the ensuing public attention, although 
the timing and the impact of different variables such as actual price changes versus media and 
political scrutiny needs to be accurately identified by further research. In spite of that, our 
conclusions on the role internal information plays with regard to switching suppliers and tariffs 
is in good agreement across various specifications. External information appears to be the 
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primary reason for household decision-making changes. Our finding opens up the potential for 
exploring other influences on household activity such as promotion of price comparison 
websites, media discourse and public debate, which raise consumer attention to their activities 
in the market. 
 
References 
Ashford, J., and Sowden, R. (1970). Multi-Variate Probit Analysis. Biometrics, 26(3), 535-546.  
Baltas, G. (2004). A model for multiple brand choice. European Journal of Operational Research 154(1), 144-
149. 
Becker, H., Loder, A., Schmid, B., & Axhausen, K. W. (2017). Modeling car-sharing membership as a mobility 
tool: a multivariate Probit approach with latent variables. Travel Behaviour and Society 8, 26-36. 
Bei, L. T., Chen, E. Y., and Widdows, R. (2004). Consumers' online information search behavior and the 
phenomenon of search vs. experience products. Journal of Family and Economic Issues 25(4), 449-467.  
Burroughs, J. E., and Rindfleisch, A. (2002). Materialism and well-being: A conflicting values 
perspective. Journal of Consumer Research 29(3), 348-370. 
Burnham, T. A., Frels, J. K., & Mahajan, V. (2003). Consumer switching costs: A typology, antecedents, and 
consequences, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 31(2), 109-126. 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) (2016). Energy Market Investigation: Final Report, 24 June. 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5773de34e5274a0da3000113/final-report-energy-market-
investigation.pdf 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) (2017). Digital Comparison Tools: Consumer Research Final report. 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/58e224f5e5274a06b3000099/dcts-consumer-research-final-
report.pdf. 
Defeuilley, C. (2009). Retail competition in electricity markets, Energy Policy, 37(2), 377-386. 
Daglish, T. (2016). Consumer governance in electricity markets, Energy Economics 56, 326-337. 
Ek, K., and P. Söderholm (2008). Households' switching behavior between electricity suppliers in Sweden, 
Utilities Policy 16(4): 254-261. 
ECME Consortium (2010). The functioning of retail electricity markets for consumers in Europe, Commission 
Staff Working Document, Brussels: European Commission. Report EAHC/FWC 2009-6-01, November.  
Economides, N., K. Seim, and V.B. Viard (2008). Quantifying the benefits of entry into local phone service, RAND 
Journal of Economics 39(3), 699-730. 
Foster, A. (2004). A nonlinear model of information‐seeking behavior, Journal of the Association for Information 
Science and Technology, 55(3), 228-237. 
Flores Sandoval, M. and Waddams Price, C. (2018). The Role of Attitudes and Marketing in Consumer Behaviours 
in the British Retail Electricity Market, The Energy Journal 39 (4). 153-179. 
 39 
 
FDS, (2008). Ofgem Research Report on Vulnerable Consumers’ Engagement with the Energy Market. FDS 
International Ltd, London (2008). https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/sites/default/files/docs/2008/11/non-
vulnerable_0.pdf. 
Fornell, C. (1992). A National Customer Satisfaction Barometer: The Swedish Experience. Journal of Marketing 
56 (2): 6-21. 
Grant, R., Clarke, R. J., and Kyriazis, E. (2007). A review of factors affecting online consumer search behaviour 
from an information value perspective. Journal of Marketing Management 23(5-6), 519-533. 
Giulietti, M., J. Otero, and M. Waterson (2010). Pricing behavior under competition in the UK electricity supply 
industry, Oxford Economic Papers 62(3), 478-503. 
Giulietti, M., Waterson, M., & Wildenbeest, M. (2014). Estimation of search frictions in the British electricity 
market. Journal of Industrial Economics, 62(4), 555-590. 
Greene W.H. (2008). Discrete Choice Modeling. in Palgrave Handbook of Econometrics: Applied Economics, 
Vol. 2, pp.473-556, edited by Mills T.C. & Patterson K. Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
He, X., and Reiner, D.M. (2017). Why Consumers Switch Energy Suppliers: The Role of Individual Attitudes, The 
Energy Journal 38(6), 25-54. 
Honka, E. (2014). Quantifying search and switching costs in the US auto insurance industry. The RAND Journal 
of Economics, 45(4), 847-884. 
Hortaçsu, A., S.A. Madanizadeh & S.L. Puller (2017). Power to choose? An analysis of consumer inertia in the 
residential electricity market, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 9(4), 192-226.  
Keaveney, S. M. (1995). Customer switching behavior in service industries: An exploratory study. The Journal of 
Marketing, 71-82. 
Jin, L., He, Y., and Ying Zhang, (2014). How Power States Influence Consumers' Perceptions of Price Unfairness, 
Journal of Consumer Research, 40(5), 818–833 
Jones, M.A., Mothersbaugh, D.L. and Beatty, S.E. (2000). Switching Barriers and Repurchase Intentions in 
Services, Journal of Retailing 76 (2), 259–74. 
Khatwani, G., and Das, G. (2015). An internet information search channel evaluation model: the role of internet 
usage skills and psychological parameters. International Journal of Electronic Marketing and Retailing 6(4), 
299-314. 
Klein, L. R. (1998). Evaluating the potential of interactive media through a new lens: Search versus experience 
goods, Journal of Business Research 41(3), 195-203. 
Lee, B. K., & Lee, W. N. (2004). The effect of information overload on consumer choice quality in an on-line 
environment, Psychology & Marketing 21(3), 159-183. 
Lewbel, A., Dong, Y., and Yang, T. (2012). Comparing features of convenient estimates for binary choice models 
with endogenous regressors, Canadian Journal of Economics 45(3), 809–829. 
Lind, D., Marchal, W.G., and Mason, R.D. (2002). Statistical Techniques in Business and Economics. 11th ed. 
Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin. 
Littlechild, S.C. (2000). Why We Need Electricity Retailers: A Reply to Joskow on Wholesale Spot Price pass-
through, Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0008, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. 
Littlechild, S. (2016). Contrasting Developments in UK Energy Regulation: Retail Policy and Consumer 
Engagement. Economic Affairs 36(2), 118–132.  
 40 
 
Mattila, A.S. (2001). The Impact of Relationship Type on Customer Loyalty in a Context of Service 
Failures, Journal of Service Research, 4 (2), 91–101. 
Moore W. L. and Lehmann D. R. (1980). Individual differences in search for a nondurable, Journal of Consumer 
Research 7 (3), 296-308. 
Miller, G. A. (1956). The magical number seven, plus or minus two: some limits on our capacity for processing 
information. Psychological Review 63(2), 81-97. 
Miravete, E.J. (2003). Choosing the wrong calling plan? Ignorance and learning. American Economic Review 
93(1). 297-310.  
Ofcom (2016). The Consumer Experience, 2015 Research Annex, London: Ofcom. 10 February.  
Ofgem (2011). Retail market Review: Findings and initial proposals. London: Office of Gas and Electricity 
Markets.  
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/sites/default/files/docs/2011/03/rmr_final.pdf. 21st March. 
Ofgem (2014). 21 million Brits missing a trick on shopping for better energy bills. London: Office of Gas and 
Electricity Markets. 
Ofgem (2017). Decision to modify the domestic and non-domestic Standards of Conduct. London: Office of Gas 
and Electricity Markets, 14 August. https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/system/files/docs/2017/08/final_decision_-
_standards_of_conduct_for_suppliers_in_the_retail_energy_market.pdf. 
ONS (2017a). Statistical Bulletin: Population Estimates for UK, England and Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland: mid-2016, Office of National Statistics 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/bulle
tins/annualmidyearpopulationestimates/mid2016  
ONS (2017b). Statistical Bulletin: Internet access – households and individuals: 2017. Office of National 
Statistics. 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/householdcharacteristics/homeinternetandsocialm
ediausage/bulletins/internetaccesshouseholdsandindividuals/2017  
Pereira, P. (2005). Do lower search costs reduce prices and price dispersion? Information Economics and 
Policy 17(1), 61-72. 
Ping, R. A. (1993). The effects of satisfaction and structural constraints on retailer exiting, voice, loyalty, 
opportunism, and neglect. Journal of Retailing 69(3), 320-352. 
Pollitt, M. G., & Haney, A. B. (2014). Dismantling a competitive retail electricity market: residential market 
reforms in Great Britain. The Electricity Journal 27(1), 66-73. 
Porter, M.E. (1980). Competitive Strategy. New York: Free Press. p10-11. 
Robinson, M. A. (2010). An empirical analysis of engineers' information behaviors. Journal of the Association for 
Information Science and Technology 61(4), 640-658. 
Ratchford, B. T. (2001). The economics of consumer knowledge. Journal of Consumer Research 27(4), 397-411. 
Riphahn, R. T., & Serfling, O. (2005). Item non-response on income and wealth questions. Empirical 
Economics, 30(2), 521-538. 
Shah, A. M., Eisenkraft, N., Bettman, J. R., & Chartrand, T. L. (2016). ‘Paper or Plastic?’: How We Pay Influences 
Post-Transaction Connection, Journal of Consumer Research 42(5), 688-708. 
 41 
 
Six, M., F. Wirl, & J. Wolf (2017). Information as potential key determinant in switching electricity 
suppliers, Journal of Business Economics 87(2), 263-290. 
Simon, H.A. (1957). Models of man; social and rational. Oxford, England: Wiley. 
Simon, H.A. (2000). Bounded rationality in social science: Today and tomorrow. Mind & Society, 1(1), 25-39. 
Smith, G.E., Venkatraman, M.P., Dholakia, R.R. (1999). Diagnosing the search cost effect: Waiting time and the 
moderating impact of prior category knowledge, Journal of Economic Psychology 20, 285–314.  
TNS (2016). Consumer engagement in the energy market since the Retail Market Review: 2016 Survey 
Findings. August. London: Office of Gas and Electricity Markets. 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/system/files/docs/2016/08/consumer_engagement_in_the_energy_market_since
_the_retail_market_review_-_2016_survey_findings.pdf     
Urbany, J. E. (1986). An Experimental Examination of the Economics of Information, Journal of Consumer 
Research 13(2), 257-271. 
Valsesia, F., Nunes, J.C., and Ordanini, A. (2016). What Wins Awards Is Not Always What I Buy: How Creative 
Control Affects Authenticity and Thus Recognition (But Not Liking). Journal of Consumer Research 42(6), 
897-914.  
van Knippenberg, D., Dahlander, L., Haas, M. R., & George, G. (2015). Information, attention, and decision 
making. Academy of Management Journal, 58(3), 649-657. 
Waddams Price, C. & Zhu, M. (2016). Non-discrimination Clauses: Their Effect on British Retail Energy 
Prices. Energy Journal, 37(2). 
Wilson T. (1997). Information behaviour: An interdisciplinary perspective. Information Processing & 
Management, 33(4), 551–572.  
Wilson C. & Waddams Price C. (2010). Do consumers switch to the best supplier. Oxford Economic Papers 
62(4), 647–668. 
Wilson, C.M. (2012). Market frictions: A unified model of search costs and switching costs European Economic 
Review 56(6). 1070-1086.  
Wolter, J. S., Bock, D., Smith, J. S., & Cronin Jr, J. J. (2017). Creating Ultimate Customer Loyalty Through 
Loyalty Conviction and Customer-Company Identification. Journal of Retailing 93(4), 458-476.  
Wooldridge J. (2002), Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data, 1st ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Xiao, N., Sharman, R., Rao, H. R., & Upadhyaya, S. (2014). Factors influencing online health information search: 
An empirical analysis of a national cancer-related survey. Decision Support Systems 57, 417-427. 
Zauberman, G. (2003). The Intertemporal Dynamics of Consumer Lock-In, Journal of Consumer Research 30(3), 
405–419. 
 
  
 42 
 
Appendix 
 
Table A-1   Complete results from baseline multivariate probit regression (MPR) 
 
Switch ES  Change ET  Change PM 
Coef. Std. Err  Coef. Std. Err  Coef. Std. Err 
n_belief -0.3594*** (0.027)  -0.1315*** (0.026)  -0.0220 (0.037) 
knowSpd 0.1362*** (0.041)  0.2584*** (0.042)  0.1480** (0.058) 
familiar 0.2998*** (0.026)  0.4530*** (0.025)  0.1104*** (0.036) 
reg_int 0.1842** (0.072)  0.1668* (0.091)  0.2407** (0.110 
message -0.2643*** (0.069)  0.1969** (0.084)  0.1025 (0.107) 
reg_int×message 0.1135 (0.078)  0.2429** (0.095)  -0.0085 (0.119) 
         
d2014 -0.0523* (0.032)  -0.1557*** (0.031)  0.0234 (0.043) 
d2016 0.0836*** (0.032  -0.0178 (0.031)  -0.0243 (0.046) 
switchother 0.2457*** (0.029)  0.2010*** (0.028)  0.1563*** (0.039) 
socgrade 0.0513* (0.030)  0.1304*** (0.030)  -0.0944** (0.044 
male -0.0612** (0.026)  -0.0578** (0.026)  -0.0462 (0.036) 
work -0.0576** (0.032)  -0.0875*** (0.033)  -0.0838* (0.044) 
language 0.2739*** (0.050)  0.2736*** (0.051)  -0.1728*** (0.058) 
movehouse 0.5284*** (0.038)  0.0834** (0.042)  0.4863*** (0.048) 
numbhh 0.0371*** (0.009)  0.0101 (0.010)  -0.0060 (0.014) 
finstr 0.0325 (0.029)  -0.0117 (0.029)  0.0749** (0.038) 
         
income（cat.11 as the ref.)         
1 -0.0038 (0.071)  -0.2015** (0.079)  0.1175 (0.088) 
2 0.0486 (0.049)  -0.1591*** (0.051)  0.0973 (0.065) 
3 0.0553 (0.045)  0.0192 (0.044)  -0.0173 (0.065) 
4 0.0779 (0.054)  0.1454*** (0.050)  0.2149*** (0.068) 
5 0.0638 (0.053)  0.1877*** (0.050)  0.0472 (0.074) 
6 0.0841* (0.049)  0.2068*** (0.046)  0.1621** (0.065) 
7 0.1373** (0.057)  0.1469*** (0.055)  -0.0789 (0.086) 
8 0.1475** (0.059)  0.1611*** (0.057)  0.0115 (0.087) 
9 0.2164*** (0.068)  0.1416** (0.068)  0.1475 (0.098) 
10 0.2480*** (0.072  0.3411*** (0.070)  0.0870 (0.109) 
         
age_2 0.0081 (0.035)  0.2859*** (0.036)  -0.0696 (0.046) 
age_3 0.0227 (0.048)  0.4089*** (0.048)  -0.1722*** (0.065) 
edu_2 0.0103 (0.041)  0.0523 (0.042)  0.0056 (0.058) 
edu_3 -0.0139 (0.049)  0.1311*** (0.048)  0.0264 (0.066) 
edu_4 0.0419 (0.046)  0.1737*** (0.045)  0.0652 (0.064) 
region_2 -0.0375 (0.059)  0.0357 (0.057)  0.0531 (0.078) 
region_3 -0.0355 (0.046)  0.0311 (0.044)  0.0996* (0.059) 
Notes: This table reports the complete results from the baseline MPR model (left-hand of Table 4) with pooled data.  
*, **, and *** represent significance of 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. The figures in brackets are robust standard errors. For 
income, the 11th category is the reference group; for education, age and region, the first category is the reference group in each case. 
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Table A-2   Results from pooled MPR (using 10th income level as reference category) 
  Switch ES  Change ET  Change PM 
  Coef. Std. Err   Coef. Std. Err  Coef. Std. Err 
n_belief -0.359*** (0.027)  -0.131*** (0.026)  -0.022 (0.037) 
knowSpd 0.136*** (0.041)  0.258*** (0.042)  0.148** (0.058) 
familiar 0.300*** (0.026)  0.453*** (0.025)  0.110*** (0.036) 
reg_int 0.184** (0.072)  0.167* (0.091)  0.241** (0.110) 
message -0.264*** (0.069)  0.197** (0.084)  0.103 (0.107) 
reg_int×message 0.113 (0.078)  0.243** (0.095)  -0.008 (0.119) 
          
d2014 -0.052* (0.032)  -0.156*** (0.031)  0.023 (0.043) 
d2016 0.084*** (0.032)  -0.018 (0.031)  -0.024 (0.046) 
switchother 0.246*** (0.029)  0.201*** (0.028)  0.156*** (0.039) 
socgrade 0.051* (0.030)  0.130*** (0.030)  -0.094** (0.044) 
male -0.061** (0.026)  -0.058** (0.026)  -0.046 (0.036) 
work -0.058* (0.032)  -0.087*** (0.033)  -0.084* (0.044) 
language 0.274*** (0.050)  0.274*** (0.051)  -0.173*** (0.058) 
movehouse 0.528*** (0.038)  0.083** (0.042)  0.486*** (0.048) 
numbhh 0.037*** (0.009)  0.010 (0.010)  -0.006 (0.014) 
finstr 0.033 (0.029)  -0.012 (0.029)  0.075** (0.038) 
         
income（cat.10 as the ref.)         
1 -0.252*** (0.097)  -0.543*** (0.102)  0.030 (0.134) 
2 -0.199** (0.083)  -0.500*** (0.083)  0.010 (0.122) 
3 -0.193** (0.079)  -0.322*** (0.077)  -0.104 (0.119) 
4 -0.170** (0.082)  -0.196** (0.079)  0.128 (0.119) 
5 -0.184** (0.081)  -0.153** (0.078)  -0.040 (0.121) 
6 -0.164** (0.077)  -0.134* (0.075)  0.075 (0.114) 
7 -0.111 (0.082)  -0.194** (0.080)  -0.166 (0.126) 
8 -0.100 (0.082)  -0.180** (0.080)  -0.075 (0.125) 
9 -0.032 (0.088)  -0.200** (0.087)  0.060 (0.132) 
11 -0.248*** (0.072)  -0.341*** (0.070)  -0.087 (0.109) 
          
age_2 0.008 (0.035)  0.286*** (0.036)  -0.070 (0.046) 
age_3 0.023 (0.048)  0.409*** (0.048)  -0.172*** (0.065) 
edu_2 0.010 (0.041)  0.052 (0.042)  0.006 (0.058) 
edu_3 -0.014 (0.049)  0.131*** (0.048)  0.026 (0.066) 
edu_4 0.042 (0.046)  0.174*** (0.045)  0.065 (0.064) 
region_2 -0.037 (0.059)  0.036 (0.057)  0.053 (0.078) 
region_3 -0.035 (0.046)  0.031 (0.044)  0.100 (0.059) 
rho rho12: 0.211*** ;   rho13: 0.334*** ;   rho23: 0.320*** 
Wald chi2 973 
Controls & year dummy Y 
Obs. 16128 
Notes: This table reports results of the baseline MPR with pooled data, using 10th income decile as the reference category.  
*, **, and *** represent significance of 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. The figures in brackets are robust standard errors. For 
income, the 10th category is the reference; for education, age and region, the first category is the reference group in each case. 
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Table A-3   Cross-section estimation results from MPR including TCR 
 2015  2016 
  YES YET YPM  YES YET YPM 
n_belief -0.4391*** -0.1215*** -0.0721  -0.3877*** -0.1332*** -0.0645 
 (0.050) (0.047) (0.068)  (0.049) (0.048) (0.070) 
knowSpd 0.0996 0.2416*** 0.0083  0.2191*** 0.3687*** 0.1318 
 (0.076) (0.074) (0.097)  (0.073) (0.077) (0.105) 
familiar 0.2449*** 0.4450*** 0.0994  0.2795*** 0.4216*** 0.0188 
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.068)  (0.047) (0.047) (0.069) 
reg_int 0.5394*** 0.3523*** 0.1444  0.2468*** 0.3367*** 0.1961** 
 (0.086) (0.079) (0.104)  (0.075) (0.078) (0.102) 
TCR -0.0808 0.2783** 0.0986  0.0197 0.4834*** -0.0493 
 (0.189) (0.136) (0.198)  (0.120) (0.110) (0.203) 
reg_int×TCR 0.1974 0.2313 0.0336  0.0957 0.1104 0.1976 
  (0.198) (0.147) (0.215)  (0.133) (0.123) (0.218) 
rho rho12: 0.233
***;  rho13: 0.273
***;  rho23: 0.298
***  rho12: 0.166
***;  rho13: 0.398
***;  rho23: 0.359
*** 
Controls  Y  Y 
Wald chi2 359  330 
Obs.     4951  4908 
Note: This table reports the results of the MPR where the variable “message” is replaced by TCR, using cross-sectional data and dropping the 
year dummies. All equations include a constant term and same demographic controls as in Table 4. Because TCR data is not available for 2014, 
here only the results for 2015 and 2016 are reported.  
*, **, and *** represents significance of 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
 
A.1. The role of actual energy expenditures 
Rather than only examining the binary variable of whether respondents claim to know 
their expenditure, we tried to explore whether the actual expenditure (or at least claims of the 
actual levels) were related to switching behavior. We created a variable ‘spd_n’ categorizing 
energy expenditure into six categories, thereby replacing the binary variable ‘enspd’ by the new 
variable in regressions. The first category of ‘spd_n’, i.e. spd_0, indicates the respondents who 
did not know their expenditure. For the respondents who reported their expenditure, we 
calculated their annual expenditure levels,1 and categorized these annual values into quintiles. 
                                                 
1 The questionnaire offered the respondents the possibility to choose between seven categories for report their expenditure: weekly, fortnightly, 
every four weeks, calendar month, quarterly, twice yearly, and annual, which we then aggregated as appropriate to obtain annual expenditures. 
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Thus, we obtain the other five categories (from spd_1 to spd_5), where spd_1 refers to the 
bottom 20% in terms of expenditure and spd_5 refers to the top 20% (Table 2).  
For the model variant Specification A1, we take spd_0 as the reference category. This 
allows us to compare every category of those who know their expenditure with those who did 
not know. The results are presented in the first set of columns of Table A-4 (Spec.A1). Since 
the estimation results for other variables do not differ significantly from the baseline model, 
our analysis focuses on variable ‘spd_n’. Almost all categories of respondents who knew their 
expenditure are more likely to switch ETs and ESs, compared to those who did not know their 
expenditure. This finding confirms our earlier conclusion that knowing one’s energy 
expenditure does matter for switching. However, there is no evidence the effect becomes any 
weaker or stronger with greater expenditure.  
Next, we use ‘spd_1’ as the reference category to enable a comparison with those on the 
lowest expenditure level. The results are presented in the columns labeled Spec.A2. Compared 
to the lowest expenditure category, while the respondents who did not know their expenditure 
are more likely to change ETs, a few categories are more likely to switch ESs or ETs. Still here 
is no evidence for an increasing/decreasing effect of the expenditure.  
One might be concerned that the non-significance of the expenditure level is caused by a 
correlation between the income and expenditure variables since they are both included in the 
model, so we excluded the income variable and obtain Specification A3. The regression results 
presented in the third set of columns (Spec.A3) show there is no significant difference between 
the results of Spec.A2 and Spec.A3.  
Finally, we directly used a continuous variable ‘lenspd’, measured by logarithms of the 
expenditure values, to further test if the expenditure itself influences switching decisions. The 
results displayed in the rightmost set of columns (Spec.A4) show that the expenditure has 
influence on neither switching ESs nor ETs. 
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Table A-4   Estimation results with pooled MPRs, including level of energy expenditure a 
  Spec.A1a       Spec.A2 b       Spec.A3 c       Spec.A4 d     
  YES YET YPM   YES YET YPM   YES YET YPM   YES YET YPM 
n_belief -0.3600*** -0.1305*** -0.0231  -0.3600*** -0.1305*** -0.0231  -0.3611*** -0.1321*** -0.0237  -0.3753*** -0.1379*** -0.0347 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.037)  (0.027) (0.026) (0.037)  (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)  (0.029) (0.027) (0.039) 
spd_0     -0.0794 -0.2097*** -0.0618  -0.0881* -0.2117*** -0.0794     
     (0.049) (0.050) (0.070)  (0.049) (0.050) (0.050)     
spd_1 0.0794 0.2097*** 0.0618             
 (0.049) (0.050) (0.070)             
spd_2 0.1959*** 0.3414*** 0.1527**  0.1166*** 0.1317*** 0.0909  0.1192*** 0.1418*** 0.0884     
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.070)  (0.043) (0.042) (0.061)  (0.043) (0.041) (0.041)     
spd_3 0.1673*** 0.2418*** 0.1008  0.0879** 0.0321 0.0389  0.0922** 0.0476 0.0345     
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.069)  (0.043) (0.042) (0.061)  (0.043) (0.042) (0.042)     
spd_4 0.1320*** 0.2921*** 0.2057***  0.0526 0.0824* 0.1438**  0.0585 0.1027** 0.1385**     
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.070)  (0.045) (0.044) (0.063)  (0.045) (0.044) (0.044)     
spd_5 0.1149** 0.2003*** 0.2255***  0.0355 -0.0094 0.1637***  0.0452 0.0141 0.1600**     
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.069)  (0.045) (0.045) (0.063)  (0.045) (0.044) (0.044)     
lenspd             0.0214 0.0237 0.0819** 
             (0.027) (0.026) (0.042) 
familiar 0.2979*** 0.4513*** 0.1143***  0.2979*** 0.4513*** 0.1143***  0.2943*** 0.4438*** 0.1094***  0.3074*** 0.4394*** 0.0946** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.036)  (0.026) (0.025) (0.036)  (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)  (0.028) (0.027) (0.038) 
reg_int 0.1813** 0.1652* 0.2416**  0.1813** 0.1652* 0.2416**  0.1794** 0.1816** 0.2476**  0.1748** 0.2324** 0.2377* 
 (0.072) (0.091) (0.110)  (0.072) (0.091) (0.110)  (0.072) (0.091) (0.091)  (0.081) (0.103) (0.122) 
message -0.2667*** 0.1909** 0.1105  -0.2667*** 0.1909** 0.1105  -0.2638*** 0.2001** 0.116  -0.3094*** 0.2606*** 0.1121 
 (0.069) (0.084) (0.107)  (0.069) (0.084) (0.107)  (0.069) (0.084) (0.084)  (0.079) (0.097) (0.120) 
reg_int×messg 0.115 0.2450** -0.0106  0.115 0.2450** -0.0106  0.123 0.2533*** -0.0163  0.1471* 0.1985* 0.0024 
  (0.079) (0.095) (0.119)   (0.079) (0.095) (0.119)   (0.079) (0.095) (0.095)   (0.088) (0.108) (0.133) 
rho12 ; rho13 ; rho23 0.210***; 0.335***; 0.320*** 
 0.210***; 0.335***; 0.320***  0.212***; 0.333***; 0.319***  0.192***; 0.322***; 0.304*** 
Wald chi2 978  978  953  817 
Controls & year dummy Y  Y  No control for income  No control for income 
Obs. 16128   16128   16128   13816 
(a) Spec.A1 is different from the baseline specification by dropping variable ‘KnowSpd’ and including a categorical variable ‘spd_n’ , where category ‘spd_0’, indicating “do not know energy expenditure” is taken as the 
reference category. (b) Spec.A2 is different from Spec.A1 by using the category spd_1, the lowest level of energy expenditure, as the reference. (c) Spec.A3 is different from Spec.A2 by dropping the categorical variable 
for income. (d) Spec.A4 is different from Spec.A3 by replacing categorical variable ‘spd_n’ with a continuous variable measuring the values of energy expenditure, labeled ‘lenspd’’.  
A.2. Including fuel type and payment method 
We consider whether ignoring payment method and fuel type could result in clear changes 
in estimates of other variables (Table A-5). 
To investigate the effect of payment method, we introduce the variable ‘direct debit’, into 
the regressions, but the possible reverse causality between this variable and the engagement 
behaviors could lead to an endogeneity problem. We cannot exclude the possibility that 
households have chosen to pay by direct debit as a consequence of previous switching 
decisions.  
We use an additional regression to address the endogeneity problem. In the additional 
regression, a new variable, ‘everswitch’, is used as the instrumental variable for ‘direct debit’. 
As described in Table 2, ‘everswitch’ indicates whether the households had ever switched 
suppliers prior to last year. 1  Since it is a predetermined variable, it can be regarded as 
exogenous and taken as the instrument for endogenous explanatory variables. Accordingly, the 
regression model (2) is amended as follows:  
 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑦𝐸𝑆  =𝑐𝑒𝑠 + 𝛼𝑒𝑠𝐼𝑛𝑓 +𝜃𝑒𝑠𝐸𝑥𝑓 +𝛾𝑒𝑠𝐸𝑥𝑓1𝐸𝑥𝑓2 + 𝛿𝑒𝑠𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝜗𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑑 + 𝜀 1           
𝑦𝐸𝑇  =𝑐𝑒𝑡 + 𝛼𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑓 +𝜃𝑒𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑓 +𝛾𝑒𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑓1𝐸𝑥𝑓2 + 𝛿𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝜗𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑑 + 𝜀 2             
𝑦𝑃𝑀=𝑐𝑝𝑚 + 𝛼𝑝𝑚𝐼𝑛𝑓 +𝜃𝑝𝑚𝐸𝑥𝑓 +𝛾𝑝𝑚𝐸𝑥𝑓1𝐸𝑥𝑓2 + 𝛿𝑝𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝜗𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑑 + 𝜀3
𝑎𝑑𝑑 = 𝐼(𝜑0 +𝜑1𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ+ 𝜑2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 +𝜀4)                                                        
   (A-1) 
 
In Model (A-1), 𝜀𝑖  still follow a joint normal distribution, and 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑖 , 𝜀𝑗) = 𝜌𝑖𝑗 . 
𝑎𝑑𝑑 denotes an endogenous dummy variable. I() is an indicator function. It equals one if the 
                                                 
1 ‘Everswitch’ was created by integrating two questions. Respondents were asked “have you ever switched your gas or 
electricity supplier?” By combining the responses with the responses to the ES question (i.e., whether households had switched 
energy supplier in the last year), we identified the households that switched suppliers prior to last year. Recoding this way, we 
excluded the possibility of reverse causation between this variable and others.  
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latent variable () is positive, and 0 otherwise.  𝜑1 measures the effects of consumers’ past 
switching behaviors on their choice of payment method. Thus, we obtain a simultaneous-
equation structural model with one instrumented regression for the endogenous variable. The 
test for endogeneity of a variable can be performed after fitting an endogenous model, with the 
help of 𝜌𝑖𝑗 . If 𝜌𝑖𝑗=0 for i =4 and j =1, 2, 3 cannot be rejected, the endogeneity problem does 
exist; otherwise, model (7) is appropriate. Similarly, ignoring the endogeneity of the variable 
‘𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙’ can lead to a bias of estimation.  
In the first set of columns of Table A-5, we present the results of the MPRs for 
Specification B1 (Spec.B1), by adding one additional variable, ′𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑡′ to the baseline 
model. In the second set of columns Spec.B2, we include one additional regression to Spec.B1, 
where the endogenous variable where the endogenous variable tariff calculator was 
instrumented by mobile tariff information was instrumented by past switching behavior 
(‘everswitch’). Similarly, columns Spec.B3 and Spec.B4 respectively display the results of the 
MPRs with one additional variable ‘𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙’, and the MPRs including the instrumented 
regression for the variable. 
 By comparing Spec.B1 and Spec.B2, we find that whether or not the endogeneity 
problem is considered directly influences the conclusion on payment method, particularly with 
regards to switching ESs. The estimate of the additional variable, ′𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑡′, based on 
Spec.B1, suggests the households paying energy bills by direct debit are more likely to switch 
ESs than the others (with a parameter of 0.1818); while the estimate based on Spec.B2 reveals 
an opposite conclusion (with a parameter of -1.4385). In Spec.B2, the correlations between the 
instrumented regression and other equations show the endogeneity assumption on 
𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑡 cannot be rejected; therefore, Spec.B2 is reliable.  
All else being equal, the households that pay energy bills by direct debit, are less likely to 
switch ESs; however, it does not follow those direct debit customers should be considered 
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inactive. The parameter estimated from the additional regression confirms our expectation that 
consumers now paying by direct debit are more likely to have switched at some point in the 
past. A negative association between direct debit and propensity to switch supplier may simply 
reflect a lack of motivation to change ES because of a belief that the best possible provider was 
already identified via the prior switch. That households paying by direct debit are more likely 
to change ETs reflects the more intense competition in the direct debit segments than in other 
payment-method segments, since, as reported by CMA (2016), the number of tariffs on offer 
in the direct debit segments is more than in other tariff segments while the direct debit tariffs 
are cheaper than other payment-method tariffs. 
In comparing Spec.B3 with Spec.B4, we see that ignoring the endogeneity of 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 
would lead to different conclusions on this variable. Since an assumption of endogeneity for 
𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙  cannot be rejected, Spec.B4 will be the more reliable variant of the model. 
Accordingly, we can conclude that households whose gas and electricity are supplied by the 
same supplier are more likely to switch ESs and PMs than others, but there is little evidence of 
an impact on changing ETs. 
As for other explanatory variables, comparing the estimation results between Spec.B2, 
Spec.B4 and the baseline model, it is immediately striking that there is a high degree of 
similarity between the estimated coefficients of the different models. The significance levels 
resemble each other; the same explanatory variables are significant in three models. These 
findings confirm the effects of information on switching tariffs and suppliers are robust. 
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Table A-5   Including fuel type or payment method 
  
Spec.B1    Spec.B2 a    Spec.B3 #    Spec.B4 # a  
add: direct debit  Spec.B1 + instrumented reg.  add: dual fuel  Spec.B3 + instrumented reg. 
 YES YET YPM  YES YET YPM  YES YET YPM  YES YET YPM 
n_belief -0.4125*** -0.1209*** -0.0733   -0.3024*** -0.1215*** -0.0682   -0.4468*** -0.1363*** -0.0582   -0.3114*** -0.1308*** -0.0457 
 (0.036) (0.034) (0.050)  (0.029) (0.033) (0.049)  (0.037) (0.035) (0.051)  (0.030) (0.035) (0.051) 
knowSpd 0.1870*** 0.3102*** 0.0994  0.1194** 0.3093*** 0.0967  0.1568*** 0.2946*** 0.0696  0.1116*** 0.2918*** 0.0610 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.075)  (0.046) (0.053) (0.074)  (0.056) (0.056) (0.076)  (0.040) (0.056) (0.075) 
Familiar 0.2823*** 0.4788*** 0.0847*  0.2223*** 0.4741*** 0.0830*  0.2954*** 0.4844*** 0.0626  0.2097*** 0.4835*** 0.0484 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.048)  (0.027) (0.032) (0.048)  (0.035) (0.034) (0.051)  (0.027) (0.034) (0.050) 
reg_int 0.2443** 0.1999 0.2003  0.1887** 0.1844 0.1943  0.2364** 0.2039 0.2610**  0.1936*** 0.2034 0.2474* 
 (0.096) (0.122) (0.141)  (0.074) (0.121) (0.140)  (0.099) (0.125) (0.148)  (0.071) (0.124) (0.146) 
Message -0.3866*** 0.1657 0.0068  -0.2157*** 0.1414 0.0155  -0.4265*** 0.1995** 0.0900  -0.2664*** 0.2006* 0.1017 
 (0.094) (0.112) (0.135)  (0.076) (0.111) (0.133)  (0.097) (0.114) (0.143)  (0.070) (0.114) (0.140) 
reg_int×message 0.1702 0.2050 0.0201  0.1097 0.2203* 0.0208  0.2211** 0.2419** -0.0741  0.1265 0.2422* -0.0776 
 (0.105) (0.127) (0.153)  (0.082) (0.126) (0.152)  (0.109) (0.130) (0.160)  (0.078) (0.130) (0.158) 
add 0.1818*** 0.5005*** 0.0754  -1.4385*** 0.7833*** -0.1650  0.0325 -0.0937* -0.1418*  1.3380*** -0.0370 0.3196*** 
  (0.042) (0.046) (0.060)   (0.052) (0.111) (0.112)   (0.062) (0.053) (0.079)   (0.047) (0.085) (0.108) 
Instrumented regression a                               
Everswitch   0.4866***    -0.3295***   
      (0.026)       (0.028)     
rho rho12: 0.199
***  rho12: 0.104***    rho14: 0.924***  rho12: 0.220***  rho12: 0.186***    rho14: -0.907*** 
 rho13: 0.321***  rho13: 0.321***    rho24: -0.191***  rho13: 0.361***  rho13: 0.374***    rho24: -0.060* 
 rho23: 0.338***  rho23: 0.322***    rho34: 0.148**  rho23: 0.313***  rho23: 0.294***    rho34: -0.308*** 
Wald chi2 666  1957  610  1494 
Controls & year dummy Y  Y  Y  Y 
Obs. 9547   10792   8716   9855 
Notes: This table reports the results of the MPRs from including an additional regression on fuel type or payment method, using pooled data. 
(a) Correlation tests between the equation residual errors support the endogeneity of the additional variable, direct debit, and dual fuel, respectively in Spec B2 and Spec B4. 
(#) This estimation uses 2015-16 pooled data, as the data for dual fuel users are not available for 2014.   
 
